FORMAL PRINCIPLES AND OVERRULING PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14210/nej.v28n1.p133-157

Keywords:

Overruling constitutional precedents, Formal principles, Judicial discretion, Interpretative uncertainty

Abstract

Contextualization: The adjudication of fundamental rights is surrounded by tensions that put normative objectives of complex conciliation against each other. The dispute between the vocation of constitutional courts to correctly interpret fundamental rights in light of the constitution and the need of these same courts to control the predictability of the content of such rights is one of these tensions. This tension resonates in a number of debates in constitutional theory and legal theory. This paper will delve into a specific discussion that has been continuously informed and shaped by the conflicting relationship between the normative values of correctness and predictability in legal discourse: when should constitutional courts maintain or overcome their own precedents? The analysis will focus on the horizontal dimension of the authority of precedents in constitutional jurisdiction, that is, on the influence that a court's previous decisions exert on the institution itself.

Objective: To discuss how the challenge to the authority of constitutional precedents can be controlled argumentatively, that is, to define parameters and argumentative methodologies to evaluate the correctness of the overruling of precedents in constitutional courts.

Methodology: It was used the methodology provided by the theory of principles, applying the model to two decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court.

Results: The article presented an argumentation model that aims to rationalize the overruling of precedents in situations where present courts are uncertain about what the constitution obligates, prohibits, or permits, and therefore, are unsure if past decisions correctly resolved a clash of fundamental rights. Using the methodology provided by the theory of principles, it is argued that the binding nature of precedents can be seen as a formal principle, which allows for a rational evaluation of the belonging of a given norm to the zone of judicial discretion based on a process of assigning weight to the authority of the precedent. Finally, the model is tested by applying it to two decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Túlio de Medeiros Jales, Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

Doutor em Direito do Estado pela Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Mestre em Direito Constitucional e Graduado em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Advogado. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5187-984X.  Contato: tuliojales@gmail.com

References

ALEXY, Robert. Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais. (tradução de Virgílio Afonso da Silva), São Paulo: Malheiros, 2017.

ALEXY, Robert. Formal principles: Some replies to critics. Icon, v. 12, p. 511–524, 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou051

ARGUELHES, Diego Werneck. PEREIRA, Thomaz. A decisão de Celso de Mello e o respeito a precedentes. Jota. 05.07.2016. Disponível em: https://www.jota.info/stf/supra/decisao-de-celso-de-mello-e-o-respeito-precedentes-stf-05072016.

BURTON, Steven J. The conflict between Stare decisis and overruling in constitutional adjudication. Cardozo Law Review, v.35, p.1687-1703, 2014.

BUSTAMANTE, Thomas da Rosa. Teoria do Precedente Judicial: a justificação e a aplicação de regras jurisprudenciais. São Paulo: Noeses, 2012.

DIMOULIS, Dimitri; MARTINS, Leonardo. Teoria Geral dos Direitos Fundamentais. 4 ed., São Paulo: Atlas, 2012.

DUXBURY, Neil. The Nature and Authority of precedent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818684

KLATT, Mathias. Balancing competences: How institutional cosmopolitanism can manage jurisdictional conficts. Global Constitutionalism, v. 4, p. 195-226, 2015. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381715000039

KOZEL, Randy J. The Scope of Precedent. Michigan Law Review, v.. 113, p.179- p.230, 2014.

MACCORMICK, Neil, e SUMMERS, Robert. Introduction. In MACCORMICK, Neil, e SUMMERS, Robert (orgs.). Interpreting Precedents – A Comparative Study. Vermont: Aldershot- Asgate, 1997.

NEVES, Rafael. Pacote Anticrime de Moro ponto a ponto. Congresso em Foco. Congresso em Foco. 05.02.2019. Disponível em: https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/governo/pacote-anticrime-de-moro-ponto-a-ponto-veja-como-a-lei-e-hoje-e-o-que-pode-mudar. Acesso em: 17 de novembro de 2019

PERRY, Stephen R. Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory. South Carolina. Law Review, v.6, p. 913-994, 1989.

QUISPE, Jorge Alexander Portocarrero. El rol de los principios formales en la determinación del margen de control de constitucionalidade. Revista Derecho del Estado, v.27, p. 75-102, 2011.

SCHAUER, Frederick. Thinking like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054561

SILVA, Virgílio Afonso da Silva. Direitos fundamentais e liberdade legislativa, in CORREA, Fernando Alves et al (orgs.), Estudos em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, v..3, Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2012: 915-937.

SILVA, Virgílio Afonso da. Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, v. 31, p. 273 -301, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqr004

TARUFFO, Michele. Institutional Factors Influencing Precedents, in MACCORMICK, Neil, e SUMMERS, Robert (orgs.). Interpreting Precedents – A Comaparative Study. Aldershot, Asgate, 1997.

Published

2023-04-26

How to Cite

JALES, T. de M. FORMAL PRINCIPLES AND OVERRULING PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS. Journal of Law Studies, Itajaí­ (SC), v. 28, n. 1, p. 133–157, 2023. DOI: 10.14210/nej.v28n1.p133-157. Disponível em: https://periodicos.univali.br/index.php/nej/article/view/17341. Acesso em: 24 aug. 2024.

Issue

Section

Artigos