PAYROLL-DEDUCTIBLE LOAN USING THE FGTS: HARMFUL OR BENEFICIAL TO THE POPULAR ECONOMY?

Abstract

Contextualization: The article analyzes the legal, economic, and social impacts of the new payroll-deductible loan modality that uses the Severance Indemnity Fund (FGTS) as collateral. The research is set within the context of the financialization of the Brazilian economy and the increasing over-indebtedness of the popular classes, with special attention to mass litigation and the practice of predatory advocacy.

Objectives: The study seeks to assess whether the implementation of payroll-deductible loans guaranteed by the FGTS is a beneficial measure for the popular economy or if it aggravates the social and financial vulnerability of workers. It starts from the hypothesis that, although presented as advantageous, the measure may intensify structural indebtedness and abusive litigation.

Method: The research adopts a qualitative approach, using inductive reasoning and documentary and bibliographic techniques. It draws on secondary data from official sources such as the Central Bank of Brazil and DataJud, analyzed through normative and doctrinal lenses on financialization, over-indebtedness, and predatory practices in the Brazilian justice system.

Results: The study concludes that this new credit modality is harmful, as its implementation increases the economic fragility of workers, undermines the social purpose of the FGTS, and contributes to the rise of judicial claims based on abusive practices. The article highlights the need for stricter regulation, better data protection, and public policies aimed at financial education and controlling over-indebtedness.